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TRADEMARK’S ‘SHIP OF THESEUS’ PROBLEM
Matthew T. Bodie*
I. INTRODUCTION
The “Ship of Theseus” is a classic philosophical problem posed about the
continuity of identity. In Plutarch’s telling, the ancient Athenians preserved for
posterity the famous ship piloted by Theseus after the slaying of the Minotaur.1
Once a year a delegation would travel on the ship to the island of Delos with
tribute to the god Apollo.2 Over time, the wood began to rot, and the decaying
planks were replaced with new ones. The ship became “a standing example
among the philosophers, for the logical question of things that grow; one side
holding that the ship remained the same, and the other contending that it was
not the same.”3 The conundrum was recently referenced in the Marvel Comics
Universe, as two versions of the organic android Vision puzzled over their
identities in the climax of WandaVision.4 A wrinkle was added: what if the
boards from the original ship were saved and used to recreate a version of the
ship? Would that also be the ship of Theseus?
Trademark has long had a problem with identity. The purpose of
trademark is to identify the source of goods or services and thereby make life
easier for consumers. But trademark does not make an effort to ensure that the
company that holds the mark still reflects the entity that developed the mark’s
identity. Rather, trademark has turned largely into an alienable property right,
unmoored from its created context.5 The law has severed the connection between
the mark and the entity beyond the formalities of organization law, with the
result that whoever controls the mark’s owner controls the mark. As a result,
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new owners can take advantage of reputation capital they never earned, and
those with a true connection to the success of the original business can be shut
out.6
This Essay argues against the law’s presumption that the corporate
entity should have exclusive control over the mark, no matter the continuing
connection (or lack thereof) that the entity has with the original business and
goodwill. Trademark should instead reflect the potential that the identity will
change over time, changing the meaning of the trademark along with it. Rather
than blindly empowering individual corporations, trademark law should either
pay closer attention to identity issues or should allow a wider variety of
participants to use the mark in various ways. Either of these approaches to
trademark would be messier but would reflect more accurately our complicated
reality.
II. THE PURPOSE OF TRADEMARK
A trademark is a designation—a word, a shape, or other symbolic
identifier—of the source of a particular good or service. The Lanham Act defines
a trademark to include “any word, name, symbol, or device . . . to identify and
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods.”7
Similarly, the Act defines service marks as such words, names, or symbols that
“identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service,
from the services of others and to indicate the source of the services.”8 The idea
of trademark comes from the literal “marks” that were made on goods in order
to identify their maker.9 Trademark protection was originally limited to names
This approach is jarring, given trademark’s concern with the impropriety of taking
another’s goodwill as one’s own. Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the
Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2006) (“The logic of
the misappropriation argument is deceptively simple: a defendant who attracts
consumers by using the plaintiff’s mark improperly benefits from plaintiff’s goodwill.”).
6

7

15 U.S.C. § 1127.

Id. Although trademarks and service marks have separate definitions under the Act,
the literature generally lumps service marks in with trademarks. ROBERT P. MERGES,
PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 741 (5th ed. 2010). (“In general, service marks are subject to the
same rules as trademarks . . . .”).
8

MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 8, at 733. Examples of such marks have been
found dating back 4000 years and across ancient cultures in China, India, Persia, Egypt,
Rome, and Greece. Id.
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or symbols that represented the source of the good, but now they extend to logos,
slogans, phrases, and trade dress.10 But the core idea remains one of name, or
ongoing referent. Like names of people or places, trademarks are meant to
identify a specific entity and provide a fixed reference or “rigid designator” for
that entity.11
In explaining why trademarks exist, courts and an influential set of
commentators have coalesced around the “consumer search costs” theory.12 The
idea behind the theory—known as the law and economics or the Chicago school
approach13—is that trademark reduces consumer information costs by enabling
them to identify the source of a particular good or service quickly and easily.14
As one influential jurist put it: “The fundamental purpose of a trademark is to
reduce consumer search costs by providing a concise and unequivocal identifier
of the particular source of particular goods.”15 The crux of the theory is that the
source of a particular good or service is an important piece of the informational
mosaic that goes into a consumer purchase. Using a name, logo, symbol, or trade
dress to establish the source is much simpler than having to determine the
source in the absence of such a marker. The continuity of the source is critical to
the connection. As William Landes and Richard Posner have described it: “A
trademark conveys information that allows the consumer to say to himself, ‘I
need not investigate the attributes of the brand I am about to purchase because
the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me that the attributes are the same

10

Id. at 740.

11

Laura A. Heymann, What is the Meaning of a Trademark?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
250, 253 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2021).

ON TRADEMARK REFORM

See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844 (2007) (“It would be difficult to overstate the level of consensus
among commentators that the goal of trademark law is—and always has been—to
improve the quality of information in the marketplace and thereby reduce consumer
search costs.”).
12

Jeremy N. Sheff, Marks, Morals, and Markets, 65 STAN. L. REV. 761, 765 (2013) (“The
dominant theoretical account of trademark law today comes from the law and economics
movement of the Chicago School.”).

13

Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L.
REV. 67, 73 (2012) (“According to the dominant theoretical account, trademark law
operates to enable consumers to rely on trademarks as repositories of information about
the source and quality of products, thereby reducing the costs of searching for goods that
satisfy their preferences.”).
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Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002).
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as that of the brand I enjoyed earlier.’”16 Of course, for trademarks to be useful,
the source of the goods or services does, in fact, have to provide critical
information about the quality of the goods or services themselves.17 These
positive associations can be categorized as firm reputation or goodwill.
Trademark promotes the development of goodwill through the prevention
of misappropriation.18 In straightforward instances of trademark infringement,
one company uses the name, symbol, logo, or trade dress of another firm to
pretend that the goods or services come from that source—for example, a
knockoff company putting the Disney name on their own products.19 Much of
trademark litigation and scholarship has settled into debates about the scope of
trademark rights: whether and to what extent the holder of a certain trademark
should be able to prevent others from using the particular mark, and under
what circumstances. Trademark plaintiffs endeavor to prove, through consumer
surveys focused on brand awareness, that another’s use of or reference to their
mark will create a likelihood of confusion.20 The larger the space that the brand
occupies, the more territory the company can claim for its exclusive use. The
expansion of licensing and claims against dilution have worried the field that
trademark is becoming too powerful. Big companies often bully smaller ones
into abandoning their names and brands that come within a whiff of the larger
company’s mark, even if these claims can be specious.21 As the need for

WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 167 (6th ed. 2003) (chapter on the economics of trademark
law).
16

Id. (“The value of trademark to a firm . . . is the saving in consumers’ search costs
made possible by the information that the trademark conveys or embodies about the
quality of the firm’s brand.”).

17

Bone, supra note 6, at 549 (“It is customary to refer to trademark law as protecting a
seller’s goodwill in its mark.”).
18

19

15 U.S.C. § 1114.

6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
32:158 (4th ed. 2014) (“To an extent not true in other fields of law, in trademark and
false advertising disputes the perceptions of large groups of ordinary people are key
factual issues.”).
20

Barton Beebe & C. Scott Hemphill, The Scope of Strong Marks: Should Trademark
Law Protect the Strong More Than the Weak?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339 (2017); Leah Chan
Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625 (2011); Irina D. Manta,
Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
853, 866-67 (2012).
21
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protectible brand identities grows apace, there is real fear that we may run out
of unclaimed marks for use.22
There is another problem, however, lurking in the background of the law
of trademark. If trademark endeavors to identify a particular source for goods or
service—to provide a proper name for that source—then what exactly is the
source? If trademark serves as a rigid designator of particular objects, then
what is the nature of the objects?23 When we refer to names for people or places,
we have fixed physical manifestations that represent an individual person or
geographical location. But trademark refers to something much less identifiable,
much less certain. In order to make its doctrine work, trademark law has made
a series of methodological compromises—compromises that are coming under
increasing strain.
III. TRADEMARK’S BLINKERED VIEW OF IDENTITY
Trademarks are often lumped in with copyrights and patents as the
triumvirate of “intellectual property.”24 But trademark is different. The other
types of IP concern discrete ideas, inventions, works of art, or useful
information—specific and identifiable creations in and of themselves.25 A
trademark, however, refers to an organizational entity; it applies to the identity
of the producer, rather than the produced.26 The Walt Disney Company has
Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An
Empirical Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945, 951
(2018) (finding that the supply of available trademarks “is already severely depleted”
and the registered marks “are growing increasingly congested”).
22

Heymann, supra note 11, at 253 (quoting SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY
(1980)).
23

24

MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 8, at 24.

LANDES & POSNER, supra note 16, at 166 (arguing that trademark is “a distinct form
of intellectual property from patents and copyrights” and “has a more secure efficiency
rationale than the legal protection of inventive and expressive works”); 1 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6:3 (West 2021)
(“Unlike a patent or copyright, a trademark does not exist ‘in gross’ or by itself, apart
from the goodwill it represents.”).
25

Trademarks may also refer to the thing that is produced, although the name generally
refers back to the company that makes it. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest
Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105,
124–25 (2005) (“Trademarks historically served to identify the manufacturer or sponsor
of a good or provider of a service. Today, trademarks primarily identify goods and
services and distinguish them from those sold and provided by others, without regard to
who actually manufactures them.”).

26

5

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3828186

copyrights over its films, television shows, and cartoons, but it has a trademark
as to its name.27
But what is the Walt Disney Company? Is it the people who work under
that name? The inheritors of Walt Disney’s vision? Is it the collection of actions
that take place under that aegis? Is it the property rights—intellectual and
otherwise—that are held by the company? Trademark law has answered this
question decisively—it is simply the corporation. Ongoing debates about the
“soul” of Disney and its rightful heirs are meaningless in this context.28 The
Walt Disney Company holds the trademark for its name and “Disney” more
generally, and whoever controls the corporate entity controls the mark.
It makes some sense to simply allow the legal entity—whether it be a
corporation, LLC, partnership, or even sole proprietorship—to control the legal
rights to the trademark. It solves all the messy problems that might occur if we
try to delve more deeply into what, exactly, the trademark is protecting. We
simply assign a “person” to be the holder of the trademark and assume that the
legal person represents the underlying activity that the trademark is designed
to protect.
But it’s not that simple. Trademarks are not supposed to protect
corporate entities—they meant to designate ongoing businesses. They connect a
particular good or service with a producer of that good or service so as to identify
them. As Landes and Posner described it, “a trademark is a word, symbol, or
other signifier used to distinguish a good or service produced by one firm from
the goods or services of other firms.”29 Corporations are legal and fictional
entities who merely indicate a set of legal relationships among the
participants.30 Trademarks are not meant to name the corporation; the
company’s charter or articles of incorporation provides its name. Trademark is
meant to designate an ongoing business and the goodwill generated by the

Interestingly, Disney has trademarked Mickey Mouse as part of its brand and has
endeavored to weave the “Steamboat Willie” cartoon featuring Mickey Mouse into its
trademark protections. Sarah Sue Landau, Of Mouse and Men: Will Mickey Mouse Live
Forever?, 9 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 249, 266-67 (2020).
27

In 2003-2004, board members, employees, and shareholders led a “Save Disney”
campaign seeking to oust CEO Michael Eisner for his purported failure to maintain
Disney’s historical ethos. JAMES B. STEWART, DISNEYWAR 467-514 (paperback ed. 2006).
28

29

Landes & Posner, supra note 16, at 166.

Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Voting and the Symbolic Politics
of Corporation as Contract, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 532 (2018) (“[C]orporations are
fictional legal entities without individual corporeal or spiritual existence.”).
30
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business.31 Economic firms, not corporations, are the real business entities that
trademarks are meant to protect.
The economic literature on the theory of the firm has endeavored over
time to develop a conception of what exactly firms represent, and why we have
them. Firms have perhaps best been described as the set of relationships
between individuals for the purpose of carrying on a joint economic enterprise.32
Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz framed this as the need to coordinate
production using a variety of inputs—the need for a system of “team
production.”33 They defined team production as “production in which 1) several
types of resources are used and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs
of each cooperating resource.”34 Other approaches to the firm have emphasized
the need for firm governance to avoid the costs of opportunism;35 the need for a
repository of property rights for assets used in joint production;36 or the need to
control access to valuable assets used in production.37 Within all of these
concepts, the firm represents the relationships and economic activity that are
housed within its (conceptual) borders.
Organizational law has taken the firm and given it a legal identity. By
filling out a form and obtaining state certification, a group of people can form a
corporation, LLC, or other business entity that assumes its own legal
personhood.38 Originally corporations had a designated purpose that could be
Cf. Heymann, supra note 11, at 256 (“[O]ur task in trademark law is, first, to
determine the baptismal moment when a lexical unit becomes the proper name of a
product or service.”).

31

See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 783 (1972).
32

33

Id. at 777-79.

34

Id. at 779.

See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 114–15
(1985); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 47–48 (1996).

35

See, e.g., OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995); Oliver
Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119
(1990). See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND.
L. REV. 1399, 1404–05 (2002) (“The central insight of the property rights theory of the
firm is that an appropriate allocation of ownership rights over the assets of a firm
reduces the likelihood that one party will unfairly take advantage of the other
participants within the firm.”).
36

Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON.
387, 390 (1998).

37

Partnerships can be formed even without filing papers, if the underlying relationships
resemble an economic firm. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1997); see, e.g., Holmes v. Lerner, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130, 141–42

38
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enforced through the ultra vires doctrine.39 For a long time now, however,
business entities have been fungible creations with no specific purpose and no
natural identity. They are simply instruments for creating a specific set of legal
relationships.
The “corporatification” of the firm has disadvantaged employees by
moving control and governance of the firm into the legal entity associated with
the firm. This entity is generally a corporation controlled by shareholders that
provides no governance rights to workers.40 But workers are essential to the
economic firm. In order to avoid the transaction costs of contracting, firms
undertake to manage the production process internally, through the use of
employees.41 When Ronald Coase considered “whether the concept of a firm
which has been developed fits in with that existing in the real world,” he
determined: “[w]e can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm in
practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of ‘master and
servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”42 Even though employees are critical to
conceptions of the economic firm, they are on the outside of its legal
instantiation.43
Unfortunately, trademark only exacerbates this separation of the
workers from the firm. It hands ownership and control of the mark to the
organizational entity, rather than trying to divine who really represents the
ongoing business.44 Let’s say the Board of Trustees for the University of
(Ct. App. 1999) (finding that a partnership was created informally, without a governing
document, when parties agreed to build business together and share profits).
Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality
(with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L.
REV. 1279, 1302 (2001) (describing how the ultra vires doctrine limited “the
corporation's legal authority to certain powers enumerated in the corporate charter”).
39

40 In fact, the lodestar in corporate law is shareholder primacy: the corporation is
charged to focus solely on maximizing the wealth of its shareholders.

R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 387 (1937) (“If a workman
moves from department Y to department X, he does not go because of a change in
relative prices, but because he is ordered to do so.”).
41

42

Id. at 403.

Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1864 (2003) (“[I]n the course of the twentieth century, legal
scholars and political theorists helped remove the interests of workers (as differentiated
from shareholders, officers, and directors) from the core concerns of corporate law and
theory.”).
43

Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 376 (2009) (“[T]rademark law may serve to partition the
reputational investment of the firm from that of the rank and file employee.”).

44
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Southern California decided the university no longer needed a law school. The
Board fired all the employees—yes, let’s include the tenured professors—and
then sold off the Musick Law Building. If the Board hired all new faculty and
staff and reopened tomorrow at a new location, using a completely new
pedagogical approach to legal education, they could call their school “USC Gould
School of Law.” But then let’s suppose that all of the terminated faculty and
staff bought the Musick Law Building and reopened the next day, with the exact
same set of classes as prior to the closure. Could they call themselves USC
Gould School of Law? No.
If trademark law actually cared about the substance of the information
behind a mark, it might not ignore such a dramatic change. But it seems not to
care. When a business is sold, trademark ownership goes with it, even if the new
owners bring a much different mindset or culture.45 The old owners cannot
continue to use the mark without specific contractual provisions and
continuation in the same trade.46 In one case, the court prohibited a longtime
employee of a real-estate firm from using a modified version of the agency’s
service mark depicting the Memphis skyline, even though the mark was no
longer registered and the agency ceased to exist.47 The court chided the former
employee—somewhat ironically—by saying that “[p]roperty rights in service
marks do not exist in isolation; they exist only as a right attached to an
established business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed.”48
The former owner kept her rights, despite the disappearance of the underlying
business; the former employee had none.
The law also protects marks owned by entities that are no longer really
using them. In Wells Fargo & Co. v. ABD Insurance & Financial Services,49
Wells Fargo acquired ABD and changed ABD’s name to “Wells Fargo Insurance
Services.” Despite the name change, Wells Fargo still continued to display the
ABD mark on presentations and solicitations and maintained ABD’s prior
Am. Dirigold Corp. v. Dirigold Metals Corp., 125 F.2d 446, 454 (6th Cir.1942)
(“Ownership of trademarks impliedly passes with ownership of a business, without
express language to the contrary.”); Plitt Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of
Chicago, 697 F.Supp. 1031, 1034–35 (N.D.Ill.1998).

45

Yellowbook Inc. v. Brandeberry, 708 F.3d 837, 844 (6th Cir. 2013). In order for the
owner of a mark to retain the right to use the mark upon sale of the related business, 1)
the intent to resume “producing substantially the same product or service” must be
manifest, 2) some portion of the prior goodwill must remain with the owner, and 3)
operations must resume within a reasonable time. Berni v. Int'l Gourmet Restaurants of
Am., Inc., 838 F.2d 642, 647 (2d Cir.1988).

46

47

Taylor v. Thomas, 624 F. App'x 322, 324 (6th Cir. 2015).

48

Id. at 326.

49

758 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2014).
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website.50 Former ABD employees created a new company called Insurance
Leadership Network but used the company to launch a “new” ABD, acquiring
the ABD mark after Wells Fargo failed to renew the registration.51 Looking at
the “totality of the circumstances” to determine intent to abandon, the court
found that Wells Fargo did not intend to abandon the mark, despite its efforts to
rebrand the business under its own name.52
Trademark’s theoretical compromise—its fiction—is that the business
entity represents the firm and its ongoing business. But the compromise often
breaks down. When a well-known musical band breaks up, the holder of the
trademark may continue to operate under the band’s name and prohibit former
members from using it.53 Fans know that the band is no longer the “band” that
it once was, but the mark lives on, controlled by the owner of the corporate
entity regardless of what came before. Those who formerly worked under the
name can only refer to the association, often limited in the style and manner of
that reference.54 While this sort of effect is easiest to see when the members of
50

Id. at 1071.

51

Id.

Id. at 1072. See also ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. A/C Sec. Sys., Inc., 736 N.W.2d 737, 758
(Neb. App. 2007) (“[T[he merger of Old A/C Security into Cambridge did not, standing
alone, result in Cambridge's abandoning the trade name ‘A/C Security.’”)

52

The band “Third Eye Blind” provides one example. Lead singer Stephan Jenkins
retained control of the band’s trademark and continued operating under the band’s
name. Two other original members—bassist Arion Salazar and guitarist Kevin
Cadogan—formed a new band under the name “XEB” and once held a concert billed as
"Original Members Of Influential ’90s Band Play Their 1997 Debut Album!" Rob
Harvilla, “This Is As Much Our Story As Anybody Else’s”, THE RINGER (April 6, 2017,
11:41am EDT) https://www.theringer.com/2017/4/6/16042244/third-eye-blind-20thanniversary-semi-charmed-life-xeb-1f6cb7524abc. Jenkins has issued multiple ceaseand-desist letters to Salazar and Cadogan for the use of “Third Eye Blind” in their
promotional materials, including their bios. After one such letter, promoter Eventbrite
removed all references to Third Eye Blind from XEB’s promotional materials. Roman
Gokhman, How’s It Gonna Be? Founding Third Eye Blind members fight for right to
acknowledge contributions, RIFF MAG. (August 3, 2016, 10:58 am),
http://riffmagazine.com/features/third-eye-blind-trademark/. As Cadogan has related:
“What we’d like is to live and let live, ideally, and we’d like to stop being harassed by
him. Taking the name for himself, taking all the shares of a corporation. Pieces of paper
[were] created to cause problems, and there are pieces of paper that can be created to fix
problems, I suppose. But certainly the damage is done there.” Id.
53

See, e.g., Kassbaum v. Steppenwolf Productions, Inc., 236 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2000)
(noting that for a former member of the band Steppenwolf, phrasing like “formerly part
of Steppenwolf” had to be less prominent than other components of the promotional
advertising to avoid confusion); Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 907 (9th
Cir. 2003) (“First, the product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable

54
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the firm are limited in number, it applies any time a firm undergoes a
significant change in composition.
When there is a division in organizational ownership, then trademark
may take notice and endeavor to share the property rights. In Hart v.
Weinstein,55 the common owners of a family business had divided up operations,
and one party sought to claim the exclusive trademarks from the business. The
court held that “two persons cannot be owners of the whole of the same thing,
but they can be owners in common of the same thing”56 Both sets of owners were
allowed to use the trademarks. When two brothers split up an existing business
by each taking one of the two jointly owned corporations through which they
conducted the business, both had rights to the name.57 When one company tried
to enjoin the other from using the mark, the court held that both were entitled
to use it, despite the formal separation.58
This equanimity with the possibility for confusion is reserved for
situations where both parties have claims to the property right through
ownership of the business entity. It does not extend to “mere” former
participants in the firm, especially employees. Under those circumstances,
courts have fiercely defended the rights of the business entity that retained the
title, even if only to let the rights molder. Importantly, no real attention is paid
to whether the trademark accurately represents a continuation of the ongoing
business. In order to reclaim use of the mark, non-owners must prove
abandonment—a high hurdle requiring evidence of both non-use and intent not
to reuse.59
Trademark law does make some effort to maintain a correlation between
the mark and the underlying business. Under the Lanham Act, mark holders
are not allowed to assign the mark “in gross”—without the underlying goodwill
associated with the business.60 The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent

without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark or marks may be used
as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and third, the user must do
nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement
by the trademark holder.”).
55

737 So. 2d 72, 73 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1999).

56

Id. at 74.

57

Givens Jewelers, Inc. v. Givens, 380 So. 2d 122 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).

58

Id. at 1231-32.

15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (“A mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’ . . . [w]hen its use has
been discontinued with intent not to resume such use.”).

59

Id. § 1060(a)(1) (“A registered mark or a mark for which an application to register has
been filed shall be assignable with the good will of the business in which the mark is
used, or with that part of the good will of the business connected with the use of and
60
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deception: “Use of the mark by the assignee in connection with a different
goodwill and different product would result in a fraud on the purchasing public
who reasonably assume that the mark signifies the same thing, whether used by
one person or another.”61 Similarly, the prohibition against naked licensing is
designed to prevent the mark holder from selling off rights to use the mark with
no regard for the licensee’s actual practices. In order to license the mark, the
holder must ensure that “quality control of the goods and services is
maintained.”62 The notion of quality control relates not to excellence, but rather
to the consistency and predictability of the goods and services traditionally
provided.63 If the licensor fails to exercise quality control over the licensee, the
trademark will be considered abandoned.64 The need to police quality also
applies to certification marks, which can be cancelled if the organization
exercises insufficient control over its members to insure consistency.65
symbolized by the mark.”); Clark & Freeman Corp. v. Heartland Co., 811 F. Supp. 137,
139 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir.1984); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Grapette Co., 416
F.2d 285, 289 (8th Cir.1969). See also Lemley, supra note 5, at 1709 (“It is hard to see
how the goals of preventing consumer confusion and encouraging investments in
product quality would be furthered by allowing a company to sell the rights to a mark to
another who will not make the same products. If anything, assignments in gross are
vehicles for adding to consumer confusion, not reducing it.”). Creditors cannot levy the
trademark of a bankrupt person unless it is sold along with the ongoing business.
MCCARTHY, supra note 20, at § 18:28; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 16, at 186.
61

Moore Bus. Forms Inc. v. Ryu, 960 F.2d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 1992); see also 15 U.S.C. §
1055 (“Where a registered mark or a mark sought to be registered is or may be used
legitimately by related companies, such use shall inure to the benefit of the registrant or
applicant for registration, and such use shall not affect the validity of such mark or of its
registration, provided such mark is not used in such manner as to deceive the public.”).
62

MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 18:55, at 18–94. See also Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food
Stores, Inc, 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959) (“[T]he Lanham Act places an affirmative
duty upon a licensor of a registered trademark to take reasonable measures to detect
and prevent misleading uses of his mark by his licensees or suffer cancellation of his
federal registration”); Jake Linford, Valuing Residual Goodwill After Trademark
Forfeiture, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 811, 830 (2017) (“[I]f the assignee offers
substantially the same product, the assignment will not forfeit the mark, even if the
quality has changed somewhat.”).

63

64

15 U.S.C. § 1055; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 18:48, at 18–79.

15 U.S.C. § 1064 (permitting cancellation of a certification mark “on the ground that
the registrant (A) does not control, or is not able legitimately to exercise control over, the
use of such mark, or . . . (D) discriminately refuses to certify or to continue to certify the
goods or services of any person who maintains the standards or conditions which such
mark certified”).

65
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The law’s efforts to monitor identity, however, are fairly limited. The
doctrines as to assignment in gross and naked licensing apply to situations in
which a business entity other the original mark holder uses the mark, and so
does not apply to situations in which the trademark’s corporate holder has not
changed. Moreover, both doctrines have been sharply minimized, approaching
insignificance.66 It is well-established that trademark holders are freely entitled
to sell their mark and license it to others without significant responsibilities to
monitor the use.67 And this development is not a new one: the open disregard for
the assignment-in-gross doctrine was noted in 1931.68 Trademark has lost its
moorings to the economic firm and its underlying ongoing business.69
IV. TRADEMARK AND GRADATIONS OF IDENTITY
The law’s approach to trademark control and ownership has its
advantages. By assigning rights to a particular legal entity, the law can easily
identify who holds the mark and who can exercise the rights associated with it.
There is no need for a fact-intensive and potentially subjective examination of
whether the business that created the mark still exists as a substantive
matter.70 Any fights over who holds and can exercise the rights to the mark are

66 Lemley, supra note 5, at 1710 (“[T]he trend in trademark law clearly seems to be
toward permitting assignments in gross and ‘naked,’ or unsupervised, trademark
licenses.”).

Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment "With Goodwill": A Concept Whose Time Has
Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771, 774 (2005) (“Regardless of this rule [against assignment in
gross], however, trading in trademarks per se has always been a custom in the business
world. . . . In the past decades, the development of the consumer society and the growing
role of trademarks in the economy only have accelerated this trend.”).
67

Nathan Isaacs, Traffic in Trade-Symbols, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1210 (1931) (“The
assignment of trade-marks and trade names is frowned upon by the law. They are not
saleable in gross. Yet a lively and persistent traffic in them exists in the business world.
This is accomplished in part through a widespread ignorance of the law, or through
gentlemen's agreements that do not rely on the law, or through deliberately making the
most of the exceptions that the law recognizes.”).
68

Mark McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773,
822 (noting that “‘source’ in modern trademark law is an extraordinarily broad concept
capable of encompassing virtually any relationship between entities”).
69

Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American
Trademark Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867 (2017) (discussing the fairly routine nature of
many trademark registrations).
70
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shifted to the business entity, which has governance mechanisms to resolve such
disputes.71 Clarity of ownership is prioritized over more nuanced analysis.
But trademark’s willful blindness towards the actual life of the ongoing
business has increasing costs. The propertization of trademark allows
companies to buy, sell, and license business identities without insuring that the
substance matches the label. The brand takes precedence over all else.72 Bigger
and more capitalized companies have more power to enforce their exclusivity
and keep out competitors that might have participated in the original business.
When combined with legal tools such as covenants not to compete and trade
secret law, the owners of a business can clamp down on workers and prevent
them from using their talents in the same industry.73 The primary players
become even more powerful, their brand ever more exclusive.
The current state of trademark law also facilitates the phenomenon
known as workplace fissuring.74 When companies can control their brand but
outsource their labor requirements to other companies, the economic firm
becomes fissured into a cluster of separate entities. Many companies now
outsource crucial parts of their core businesses to either other firms or
independent contractors, rather than keeping their business in house. They can
split off these workers due to the relaxation of the legal category of “employee,”
as well as the growth of connected contracts and electronic surveillance.75 But
For example, corporate law has a highly developed legal architecture surrounding who
controls the corporation at any particular moment in time. See Grant M. Hayden &
Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Voting and the Symbolic Politics of Corporation as
Contract, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 515–16 (2018).

71

Deven R. Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981, 983–84 (2012)
(“Brands are regulated by trademark law, which fails to grasp that trademarks are
merely a subset of brands and that it manages brands at all. Instead, trademark law
champions corporations as the sole custodians of trademark meaning.”).

72

See Orly Lobel, Gentlemen Prefer Bonds: How Employers Fix the Talent Market, 59
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 663 (2020) (describing a broad landscape of anti-competitive
restrictions that are routinely placed on employees); Burk & McDonnell, supra note 44,
at 376 (describing the interaction of trademark with trade secrets and covenants not to
compete).

73

See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE 4-5 (2014); Cynthia Estlund, What Should
We Do After Work? Automation and Employment Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254, 283 (2018)
(“’Fissuring’ is the now-prevalent term, coined by David Weil, for the migration of many
jobs away from the profitable branded corporations that reign at the top of the
economy.”).
74

75 Estlund, supra note 74, at 286 (noting that technology “enables lead firms to
disintegrate products and processes into component parts, to set precise standards and
specifications, and to monitor performance and outputs of lower-cost and remote outside
suppliers”).
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critical to this whole dynamic—and largely unappreciated by legal scholars—is
the ability of the corporation to maintain its trademark over its business,
despite the shedding of legal responsibility. As David Weil has put it: “we
assume that the companies who invest millions of dollars to convince us of the
benefits of buying products under their retail nameplate or to purchase the
unique services they offer also undertake the operations needed to produce
them—including acting as the employer of all the interconnected people who
make their businesses possible. Those assumptions are increasingly wrong.”76
Trademark’s tolerance of fissuring can lead to fairly absurd results. Hotel
housekeepers make beds and clean rooms but work for third-party contractors.77
Uber monitors its drivers and dictates their pay, but those drivers are
considered entrepreneurs using the company’s platform.78 FedEx drivers deliver
FedEx packages while wearing FedEx uniforms in trucks with FedEx signage,
but the D.C. Circuit held them to be independent contractors.79 Companies are
now shedding workers and responsibilities to achieve their Platonic ideal—as
pure repositories of intellectual property and nothing more. Big brands are
heading towards a future where they no longer make things, or even provide
services—they would simply be forms on the walls of the cave.80 Trademark’s
refusal to contemplate the mark’s underlying identity has enabled this
dissolution.
It is time for a different approach. One possible avenue would be a more
vigorous inquiry into whether the underlying business still matches up with the
original meaning behind the mark.81 The doctrines of assignment in gross and
naked licensing could be reinvigorated to require more monitoring of the use of

76

WEIL, supra note 74, at 3.

77

Id. at 1.

V.B. Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker
Identities, 105 CAL. L. REV. 65, 69 (2017).

78

FedEx Home Delivery, Inc. v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also Jeffrey M.
Hirsch, Employee or Entrepreneur?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353, 367 (2011) (critiquing
the D.C. Circuit’s test).
79

June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. 967 (2017) (“A
brand such as ‘Natuzzi’ may signal a guarantee of quality, but its owners, employees,
distribution networks, and even corporate headquarters can shift over time.”).

80

81 Sheff, supra note 13, at 812 (“The idea of trademark as promise would suggest that
once consumers form certain expectations about the products to which the mark is
affixed, the mark owner has an obligation to continue to provide products consistent
with those it has offered in the past or else adequately disclose that it will no longer do
so.”).
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the mark.82 And rather than simply assuming that whoever controls the
business entity still operates the same business with the same goodwill,
trademark decisionmakers could inquire into the substance behind the mark
and the strength of competing claims to its use. If the underlying business
differed significantly from the original business, the court could diminish or
eliminate the rights to the mark, even in the absence of a change in entity.
Alternatively, we could apply a more relaxed approach to trademark, one
that allows a broader swath of people and entities to associate themselves with
the mark.83 Recognizing that a business is a complex organism that morphs over
time, the law could permit those who have played a role in its development to
claim credit.84 A trademark could play more of a role as an avenue for
communication, a reference to a brand allowing former employees, customers,
critics, and fans to participate in the meaning and understanding of that
brand.85 And instead of forcing other parties to refrain from use, courts could
allow significant common use up to the point of outright fraud as to source.86
Trademark law must recognize reality. Its purported purposes—to
identify the source of goods and services, prevent consumer confusion, and foster
See Lemley, supra note 5, at 1710 (“Not only are assignments in gross unsupported by
the traditional economic rationale for trademarks, but they do active damage to the
goals of trademark law.”).

82

Cf. Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with
Special Reference to Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 720
(2007) (arguing that “distributional considerations cannot be dealt with in a ‘one-sizefits-all’ procrustean IP framework”). For a comparable proposal in copyright, see
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Copyright Trust, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1015
(2015) (proposing the use of a trust to allow a broader swath of contributors to
participate in the value generated by the copyright).
83

It has long been recognized that goodwill can come from a variety of sources and its
nature may be somewhat capricious. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
PARTNERSHIP AS A BRANCH OF COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME JURISPRUDENCE § 99, at 139
(Boston 1841) (noting that a firm may acquire goodwill “from constant or habitual
customers, on account of its local position, or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or
affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances, or necessities, or even
from ancient partialities, or prejudices”).
84

Cf. Desai, supra note 72, at 1037 (“Corporations, consumers, and communities all play
large roles in providing information about a brand.”).

85

86 McKenna, supra note 12, at 1884 (defining trademark’s “relevant property interest . . .
as the right to continue to enjoy the patronage of consumers attracted by labor, subject
only to honest competition”). The protection for consumers could be expanded in other
ways to meet changing relationships. See Alexandra J. Roberts, False Influencing, 109
GEO. L.J. 81, 83 (2020) (proposing claims under the Lanham Act for “false influencing”
when companies disseminate deceptive claims via influencers).
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the growth of goodwill—have given way to a property right that allows firms to
leverage their brands widely and exclude all manner of players with legitimate
associations. By replacing the idea of source identity with an organizational
entity, trademark solved the messiness of policing the substance behind the
mark. But in so doing, it also conceded the field to dominance by those who
control the entities, rather than those who participate in the underlying
business.
V. CONCLUSION
In the WandaVision finale, the two Visions puzzled over their own
identities with reference to the Ship of Theseus. What if the boards from the
original ship were replaced over time, and a new ship created from the old one?
Which is the true ship? In a moment of insight, one Vision answered: “Neither
are the true ship. Both are the true ship.”87
When considering the application of trademarks, perhaps we should have
a similar appreciation for this ambiguity, this liminal space. The Walt Disney
Company is not the same thing as the Company was 75 years ago, or even a
year ago; people have come and gone, products and services have changed, and
the underlying identity of the firm continues to evolve. We assign a trademark
to the Company as shorthand, as a compromise, as a way of avoiding inevitable
disputes over who really represents the Disney brand. But it is a compromise, a
fiction—not reality. There is no “true” Disney—only a corporate entity whose
owners, executives, workers, and property holdings have changed dramatically
over time.88 A recognition of this reality should give us pause as we consider who
can use marks, for what reason, and to what legal ends.

87

WandaVision, supra note 4.

STEWART, supra note 28 (discussing the war over control of Disney as well as its
heritage and legacy).
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